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This paper estimates the economic impact of HIV/AIDS on KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and the rest of South 
Africa (RSA). We extend previous studies by employing an integrated analytical framework that 
combines the following: firm-level surveys of workers’ HIV prevalence by sector and occupation; a 
demographic model that produces both population and workforce projections; and a regionalized 
economywide model linked to a survey-based micro-simulation module. This framework permits a full 
macro-microeconomic assessment. The results indicate that HIV/AIDS greatly reduces annual economic 
growth, mainly by lowering the long-term rate of technical change. However, the impacts on income 
poverty are small, and inequality is reduced by HIV/AIDS. This is because high unemployment among 
low-income households minimizes the economic costs of increased mortality. In contrast, slower 
economic growth hurts higher-income households despite the lower prevalence of HIV among these 
households. We conclude that the increase in economic growth achieved through addressing HIV/AIDS is 
sufficient to offset the population pressure this move will place on income poverty. Moreover, incentives 
to mitigate HIV/AIDS lie not only with poorer infected households, but also with uninfected higher-
income households. Our findings reveal that HIV/AIDS will place a substantial burden on future 
economic development in KZN and RSA, confirming the need for policies to curb the economic costs of 
this pandemic. 
Keywords: HIV/AIDS, growth; poverty, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
South Africa has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) is the 
most highly afflicted province in South Africa. Recent estimates indicate that 26.4 percent of KZN’s 
working-age population is HIV-positive, compared to 15.9 percent in the rest of the country (see 
Matthews et al., 2008). Unemployment and income poverty in KZN are also much higher than the 
national average, with a third of KZN’s population living below the US$2-a-day poverty line and two-
fifths of the workforce unemployed (Hoogeveen and Özler, 2006; Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2006). The 
long-term trends in KZN are equally bleak. Recent evidence indicates that economic growth continues to 
lag behind that of the rest of the country, and poverty is rising faster in KZN than in other provinces. A 
key challenge for reviving economic development in South Africa in general, and in KZN in particular, 
lies in understanding the constraints imposed by HIV/AIDS on future economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  
Numerous studies estimating the micro-level impacts of the pandemic (see Casale and Whiteside, 
2006) confirm the severe detrimental effects imposed on infected individuals and their households. 
However, while household-level studies can capture detailed noneconomic impacts, they typically 
overlook systemic or economywide shocks from HIV/AIDS, which can have indirect or “second-round” 
consequences for both infected and uninfected population groups. Some studies have assessed the broader 
implications of HIV/AIDS for economic growth and employment in South Africa (see, for example, 
Arndt and Lewis, 2001). However, these macroeconomic studies were conducted when detailed micro-
level data on prevalence rates for different sectors and occupations were not yet available. The present 
availability of information on HIV prevalence among firms and workers now permits a more accurate 
assessment of the consequences of the pandemic. Moreover, these micro-level estimates can support more 
integrated approaches for measuring socioeconomic outcomes. 
In this paper, we estimate the growth and distributional impacts of HIV/AIDS on KZN and the 
rest of South Africa (RSA). First, we conduct a firm-level survey in four of KZN’s largest sectors. 
Second, information on workers’ HIV prevalence rates from the survey is used to calibrate an occupation-
focused demographic model. Finally, the demographic projections are imposed on a regionalized dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model linked to a household survey-based micro-simulation 
model. This integrated macro-microeconomic framework permits a more robust, empirically based 
assessment of the impacts of HIV/AIDS. Section 2 briefly describes the survey and demographic 
projections. Section 3 outlines the methodology, paying particular attention to the links between the 
demographic and DCGE models. Section 4 discusses the results of the DCGE model and their 
implications for future socioeconomic development in South Africa. The final section summarizes our 
findings.    
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2.  DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACTS OF HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The first stage of our analysis combines two demographic models.
1 The first model estimates provincial population projections for different population groups. Based on 
these results, the second model estimates workforce projections by occupational group. The parameters of 
the second demographic model are calibrated to HIV prevalence rates obtained from a firm-level survey 
of workers. This section first describes the population projections and HIV prevalence profile, and then 
discusses the firm-level survey and workforce projections. 
Population Projections 
The provincial version of the ASSA-2003 model from the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA, 
2005) was used to estimate overall population projections for KZN and RSA. The model produces annual 
population estimates with and without the effects of HIV/AIDS for the period 1985-2025. The ASSA 
model disaggregates the total population by province, gender, racial group (African, Asian, Colored and 
White) and one-year age intervals. In the model, HIV is spread via heterosexual sexual activity amongst 
adults, who are divided into risk groups according to sexual behavior. The calibration of the model is 
based on epidemiological and medical research, population census data, and HIV prevalence data from 
antenatal clinic surveys and mortality statistics. Table 1 provides a profile of HIV prevalence for the year 
2002, which is utilized as the base year for our economic analysis in later sections.   
Table 1. HIV prevalence among working-age adults in South Africa, 2002 
Population  Gender  Age   Population (millions)  HIV prevalence (%) 
group   cohort  RSA  KZN  RSA  KZN 
National   Both  All  35,252  9,250  8.7 13.4 
Africans Male  20-34  3,695  990  19.6 30.6 
   35-49  2,241  507  24.8 41.3 
   50-64  961  236  11.9 21.4 
 Female  20-34  3,820  1,088  29.8 43.3 
   35-49  2,430  655  16.2 27.3 
   50-64  1,141  325  1.6 3.0 
           
Other races  Male  20-34  995  172  1.8 1.5 
   35-49  875  160  2.3 2.2 
   50-64  521  108  0.6 0.7 
 Female  20-34  1,011  174  3.9 3.6 
   35-49  924  170  3.2 3.0 
   50-64  571  120  0.4 0.4 
Source: Own calculations using estimates from ASSA (2005) and Matthews et al. (2008). 
HIV prevalence is concentrated in working-age Africans, especially younger females (20-34 
years) and slightly older males (35-49 years). The prevalence for other racial groups is considerably lower 
for all age cohorts. Moreover, among Africans, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is heavily concentrated 
within KZN; this pattern does not exist for other races. Given the large numbers of individuals contained 
within the African and KZN populations, it is clear that this province and population group form the 
epicenter of South Africa’s HIV pandemic. The effects of this concentration are evident in the population 
projections from the ASSA model (see Table 2).  
                                                      
1 For a detailed description of the demographic model and projections see Matthews et al. (2008).   
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Table 2. Demographic projections, 2002-2025 
   Population  (millions)  Prevalence 
rate (%) 
AIDS-sick 
rate (%)     No AIDS  AIDS 
KZN 1990  3.54 3.54 0.39 0.00 
  1995  4.13 4.12 7.35 0.11 
  2000  4.64 4.57  23.18 1.28 
  2005  5.25 4.87  27.95 3.49 
  2010  5.90 5.06  27.59 3.80 
  2015  6.52 5.24  26.85 3.79 
  2020  7.16 5.43  26.49 3.70 
  2025  7.70 5.52  26.17 3.70 
RSA  1990 13.51  13.51 0.16 0.00 
  1995 16.16  16.16 3.42 0.05 
  2000  18.53 18.40 13.16  0.63 
  2005  20.96 20.15 18.06  1.92 
  2010  23.27 21.35 18.99  2.26 
  2015  25.22 22.09 18.74  2.50 
  2020  27.10 22.71 18.18  2.50 
  2025  28.73 23.12 17.78  2.43 
Source: Own calculations using estimates from ASSA (2005). 
The long-term implications of HIV/AIDS for population growth are pronounced. Without its 
effects, the adult population of South Africa is predicted to reach 36.4 million by 2025. AIDS deaths 
reduce this adult population by 7.8 million people, which is more than a quarter of the expected 
population in 2025. The predicted loss of life in KZN is even more staggering, with the adult population 
depleted by two-fifths due to HIV/AIDS. The pandemic is, however, expected to peak around 2010, with 
HIV prevalence rates beginning to fall and AIDS-related sickness and death declining after 2020. Despite 
the fact that the pandemic is predicted to “turn the corner,” its scale and concentration among working-
age adults will have grave implications for South Africa’s workforce.   
Firm-Level Survey and Workforce Projections 
Previous studies relied on population projections to estimate the economic consequences of HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa. As part of our study, Matthews et al. (2008) developed an AIDS Projection Model (APM) 
to estimate the size of the workforce in the presence and absence of HIV/AIDS. The model distinguishes 
among three occupation levels (managers, skilled workers, and laborers), genders, two racial groups 
(African and Other), and three age cohorts (20-34, 35-49 and 50-64). The APM is a demographic model, 
and therefore cannot predict changes in workforce composition (i.e., shifts in sectoral employment 
patterns driven by economic forces). This is the domain of the economywide model. However, the APM 
does combine the population projections of the ASSA model with HIV test data from the firm-level 
survey, and uses this information to predict the impact of HIV/AIDS on the workforce size for different 
occupational groups.
2 It therefore provides the critical link between the population projections described 
above and the economic analysis introduced in the next section.  
                                                      
2 The changing sectoral composition of employment is endogenously determined by the DCGE model.   
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The calibration of the APM was based on the firm-level survey data collected during our study. 
Anonymous HIV tests were conducted at 15 companies in four economic sectors: agriculture, 
manufacturing, tourism, and transport.
3 These are key sectors of the South African economy. Together 
they comprise 59.1 and 44.7 percent of KZN and RSA’s gross domestic product (GDP), respectively, and 
55.8 and 49.1 percent of their labor employment, respectively. Of the 6197 workers that we surveyed, 
only 4464 successfully completed the questionnaire. Our study sample had an overall HIV prevalence rate 
of 16.7 percent, with a 95 percent confidence interval of ± 1.1 percent. Table 3 presents the prevalence 
rates for male African workers by sector and occupation.
4 
Table 3. HIV prevalence rates for male Africans by occupation, 2002 
Sector  Age   Occupation groups 
  cohort Managers  Skilled   Laborers 
Agriculture  20-34  33.9 29.8 35.0 
  35-49  37.8 32.6 38.2 
  50-64  16.8 16.3 19.1 
Manufacturing  20-34  22.2 24.9 31.1 
  35-49  24.7 27.2 33.9 
 50-64  0.0  14.0  17.6 
       
Tourism  20-34  29.9 34.1 37.6 
  35-49  33.8 37.3 40.9 
 50-64  0.0  18.4  20.0 
Transport  20-34  13.4 20.5 32.5 
  35-49  14.3 22.4 35.1 
 50-64  7.5  11.3  17.9 
Source: Own calculations using estimates from Matthews et al. (2008). 
The survey reveals considerable heterogeneity across workers. Prevalence rates are typically 
highest for laborers (i.e., unskilled workers) within the agriculture and tourism sectors. They are lowest 
for managers and professionals, with the exception of agriculture, where prevalence rates are similar for 
all three occupational groups. Prevalence is significantly higher for the middle age cohort, which is 
consistent with observed national trends. These survey results clearly indicate that it is inappropriate to 
make broad generalizations about the sectoral and occupational trends of HIV prevalence. Therefore, the 
inclusion of an empirically-calibrated APM that produces occupation-based workforce projections greatly 
enhances the accuracy of our economic analysis compared to those in previous studies. It also provides a 
crucial link between the economic growth impacts of HIV/AIDS and its effects on employment, poverty 
and inequality. The next section describes how these demographic projections are incorporated within the 
economic modeling. 
                                                      
3 The 15 companies were surveyed over three years: two in 2005, 11 in 2006, and two in 2007. For convenience, we treat all 
survey results as reflecting HIV prevalence in 2006.  
4 The firm-level survey-based estimates of HIV prevalence are “smoothed” to account for the wider confidence intervals 
seen for specific subgroups of the sample (see Matthews et al., 2008).  
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3. ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HIV/AIDS 
HIV/AIDS affects economic growth and poverty via various impact channels. At the household level, a 
wide range of factors influence poverty; these include vulnerability from deteriorating livelihoods, 
heightened stigmatism, fragmentation of social networks, and lower investments in human capital and 
nutrition. These household-level effects need to be aggregated for us to estimate the overall impact of the 
pandemic. Moreover, while households are directly affected by HIV/AIDS, there are also broader 
implications for the economy as a whole. In our macro-microeconomic assessment, we account for not 
only households but also other actors and institutions, such as firms, markets and the government. 
However, broadening our analysis necessarily excludes some difficult-to-measure household-level 
impacts. Therefore, given our focus on economic growth, we concentrate on the income dimensions of 
poverty. Ultimately, we identify five main impact channels for HIV/AIDS: population growth, labor 
supply, labor productivity, total factor productivity, and savings and investment. This section describes 
how these impact channels are captured in the economywide model 
Simplified General Equilibrium Model 
Table 4 presents the equations of a simple closed-economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
illustrating how HIV/AIDS affects the economic outcomes examined in our analysis. The model is 
recursive dynamic, and can therefore be separated into a static “within-period” component wherein 
producers and consumers maximize profits and utility, and a dynamic “between-period” component 
wherein the model is updated based on the demographic model and previous period results, thereby 
reflecting changes in population, labor supply, and the accumulation of capital and technology.  
In the static component of the model, producers in each sector s and region r (i.e., KZN and RSA) 
produce a level of output Q in time period t by employing the factors of production F under constant 
returns to scale (exogenous productivity α) and fixed production technologies (fixed factor shares δ) (eq. 
[1]). Profit maximization implies that factor payments W are equal to average production revenues (eq. 
[2]). Labor supply L and capital supply K are fixed within a given time period, implying full employment 
of factor resources. Labor market equilibrium is defined at the regional level, so labor is mobile across 
sectors but wages vary by region (eq. [6]). National capital market equilibrium implies that capital is 
mobile across both sectors and regions, and earns a national rental rate (i.e., regional capital returns are 
equalized) (eq. [7]). 
Factor incomes are distributed to households in each region using fixed income shares based on 
the households’ initial factor endowments (eq. [3]). Total household incomes Y are then either saved 
(based on marginal propensities to save υ) or spent on consumption C (according to marginal budget 
shares β) (eq. [4]). Consumption spending includes a “subsistence” component λ that is independent of 
income and determined by household population H. Savings are collected in a national savings pool and 
used to finance investment demand I (i.e., savings-driven investment closure) (eq. [5]).
5 Finally, a single 





                                                      
5 Nell (2003) empirically tests the causality between national savings and investment in South Africa, and confirms the 
appropriateness of a savings-driven investment closure. 
6 The model’s numéraire is a consumer price index weighted by the aggregate household consumption basket.   
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Table 4a. Simplified CGE model equations 
Static model equations 
    Production   (1) 
    Factor returns  (2) 
    Income  (3) 
    Consumption  (4) 
    Investment   (5) 
    Labor market  f is labor  (6) 
    Capital market  f is capital  (7) 
    Product market  (8) 
Dynamic equations and links to the demographic model 
    Population  (9) 
    Labor supply  f is labor  (10) 
    Labor productivity       
    f is labor  (11) 
    Technical change    (12) 
    Capital supply 
 
f is capital  (13)  
  6
Table 4b. Simplified CGE model variables and parameters  
Subscripts  Endogenous variables in CGE model 
f  Factors   C  Household consumption demand quantity 
r  Regions   F  Factor demand quantity 
s  Sectors  I  Investment demand quantity 
t  Time periods  K  National capital supply 
p  Population group (race)  L  Regional labor supply 
g  Gender  M  Migration rate between regions r and r' 
a  Age cohort  P  Commodity price 
o  Occupation group  Q  Output quantity 
Exogenous parameters  W  Average factor return 
α  Total factor productivity (production shifter)  Y  Total household income 
β  Household marginal budget share  Projections from demographic model 
γ  Factor-specific productivity growth rate  DH  Population projection 
δ  Factor input share parameter  DL  Labor supply projection 
ε  Factor-specific productivity (input shifter)  DP  Predicted HIV prevalence rate 
θ  Household share of factor income  DA  Predicted full-blown AIDS prevalence rate 
κ  Base price per unit of capital stock  Base-year (2002) stock estimates 
λ  Per capita subsistence consumption quantity  sh  Household population profile (household survey) 
φ  Hick’s neutral productivity growth rate  sl  Labor force profile (labor survey) 
π  Capital depreciation rate  dh  Population profile (demographic model) 
ρ  Investment commodity expenditure share  dl  Labor force profile (demographic model) 
σ  Exogenous factor supply growth rate     
υ  Household marginal propensity to save     
μ  Exogenous labor productivity growth rate     
The model’s variables and parameters are calibrated to observed data from a provincial social 
accounting matrix (SAM) that captures the initial equilibrium structure of the KZN and RSA economies 
in 2002.
8 The parameters are then adjusted over time to reflect demographic and economic changes, and 
the model is re-solved for a series of new equilibriums for the period 2002-2015. Two simulations are 
conducted – “AIDS” and “No AIDS” – and the differences in the final values of variables are interpreted 
as the impacts of HIV/AIDS. 
Dynamic Impacts of HIV/AIDS 
Between periods, household populations H increase at rates determined by the demographic model (eq. 
[9]). Individual-level population projections DH are estimated for each region r, population group p, 
gender g and age cohort a, and are then compared to predicted population levels dh in the base year 
                                                      
8 A social accounting matrix (SAM) is a consistent database capturing all monetary flows in an economy in a given year. It 
contains information on the production technologies and demand structures of detailed sectors, regions and households, as well as 
government revenues/expenditures and foreign receipts/payments. Various datasets were used to build the 2002 provincial SAM 
for South Africa, including national accounts, the 2000 income and expenditure survey, the 2002 labor force survey; and the 
South African Standard Industrial Database (Quantec, 2007). The income and expenditure data were reconciled using cross-
entropy estimation. For more information on the SAM, see Thurlow (2005).   
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2002.
9 This ratio is multiplied by the observed demographic composition sh of each household group h in 
the CGE model to arrive at household-level population time-series for 2002-2025.
10 Similarly, labor 
supplies are based on demographic projections for occupation-based skill groups (eq. [10]).
11 In the 
DCGE model, the population and labor supply variables draw directly on the demographic projections 
DH and DL to capture the first two impact channels of HIV/AIDS. By increasing mortality, the pandemic 
reduces consumer demand and the productive capacity of the economy, which is likely to have adverse 
effects on economic growth.  
The third impact channel is the effect of morbidity on workers’ productivity. This is captured in 
(eq. [11]), where the labor productivity growth rate ε depends on the exogenous productivity growth μ 
adjusted for the share of the population that is HIV-positive DP or AIDS-sick DA (i.e., suffering from 
full-blown AIDS).
12 Under the “No AIDS” scenario, DP and DA are zero and labor productivity grows at 
μ. This growth rate is lower under the “AIDS” scenario, because we assume that HIV-positive workers 
are half as productive as uninfected workers and that AIDS-sick workers are a fifth as productive, due to 
decreased on-the-job productivity and more days spent absent from work.
13 
The fourth impact channel is the reduction in total factor productivity (TFP) caused by systemic 
shocks to the economy (eq. [12]). For example, AIDS morbidity and mortality reduces the productivity of 
uninfected workers by disrupting the production process. Moreover, the death of education and health 
professionals has long-term detrimental effects on the entire economic system. Unfortunately, this impact 
channel cannot be calibrated using the firm-level survey data or demographic model. Thus, we assume 
that AIDS reduces annual TFP growth φ by around half a percent per year. This is similar to the TFP 
losses used in other studies of South Africa and Botswana (Arndt and Lewis, 2001; Thurlow, 2006). 
The final impact channel is the adverse effect on savings and investment (see Freire, 2002). HIV/AIDS 
increases households’ healthcare spending and lowers spending on other products, such as food, shelter 
and clothing. As a coping strategy, households draw on assets or savings. Accordingly, it is assumed that 
an infected households’ share of disposable income spent on health care increases by five percentage 
points and savings rates are reduced by the same amount (i.e., β and υ in eq. [4]). This lowers the overall 
level of savings and investment (eq. [5]). Investment from the previous period is then converted into new 
capital stocks using a fixed capital price κ (eq. [13]). This is added to previous capital stocks after 
applying a fixed rate of depreciation π. New capital is endogenously allocated to regions and sectors in 
order to equalize capital returns. The model therefore endogenously determines the national rate of capital 
accumulation and supply of capital K. If HIV/AIDS reduces national income, then it lowers the level of 
savings and investable funds in the economy, thereby reducing the rate of capital accumulation and 
further reducing long-term economic growth.  
Extensions to the Full Model 
The simplified model illustrates how HIV/AIDS affects economic outcomes in our analysis. However, the 
full model drops certain assumptions.
14 Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions 
allow factor substitution based on relative factor prices (i.e., δ is no longer fixed). The model identifies 25 
sectors in KZN and RSA.
15 Intermediate demand in each sector (excluded from the simple model) is 
                                                      
9 The year 2002 is an appropriate base for both the “AIDS” and “No AIDS” scenarios, since it predates most of the main 
effects of HIV/AIDS on South Africa’s working population (see Figure 1). 
10 Demographic compositions are drawn from the re-weighted 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (StatsSA, 2001). 
11 The factor subscript f is a composite for a worker’s population group p, gender g, and occupation o. 
12 Selected values of DP and DA for the entire population are given in the final two columns of Table 2. 
13 Although the prevalence rates are estimated by the demographic model, the impact of morbidity on worker productivity 
must be assumed, because few empirical studies have estimated worker productivity losses from HIV/AIDS. Given the findings 
from Fox et al. (2004), who studied tea pickers in Kenya, our assumptions may be an upper-bound estimate of productivity 
losses. However, as seen in the next section, this impact channel is found to contribute the least to the overall economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS. 
14 The full DCGE model is an extended version of the national model described in Thurlow (2005). 
15 The 25 sectors are mapped onto the four sectors in the firm survey. Most of the sectors in the DCGE model are in  
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determined by fixed technology coefficients. Regional labor markets are further segmented across race, 
gender, and three occupation-based skill categories. A nested demand system places skill levels above 
gender and age groups. All factors are assumed to be fully employed, and capital is immobile across 
sectors. New capital from past investment is allocated to regions/sectors according to profit rate 
differentials under a “putty-clay” specification. 
The full model still assumes national product markets. However, international trade is captured 
by allowing production and consumption to shift imperfectly between domestic and foreign markets, 
depending on the relative prices of imports, exports and domestic goods. Since South Africa is a small 
country, world prices are fixed and the current account balance is maintained by a flexible real exchange 
rate (i.e., the price index of tradable-to-nontradable goods). Production and trade elasticities are 
econometrically estimated.  
Households maximize a Stone-Geary utility function such that a linear expenditure system 
determines consumption and permits non-unitary income elasticities. The latter are drawn from Case 
(2000). Households are disaggregated across the following: two regions, the racial group of household 
head (i.e., African or Other), and 14 income groups (ten deciles with the top decile separated into five 
income groups). These household groups pay taxes to the government based on fixed direct and indirect 
tax rates. Tax revenues finance exogenous recurrent spending, resulting in an endogenous fiscal deficit. 
Finally, the model includes a micro-simulation module in which each household in the 2000 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (StatsSA, 2001) is linked to its corresponding representative household in the DCGE 
model. Changes in household-level real consumption spending on each commodity are passed down from 
the DCGE model to the household survey, where total per capita consumption and poverty measures are 
recalculated.  
In summary, the full DCGE model captures the detailed sectoral and labor market structure of 
South Africa’s economy as well as the linkages among production, employment and household incomes. 
Moreover, the results from the firm-level survey and demographic model are explicitly integrated within 
the economic analysis. Although not exhaustive, the five main impact channels captured by the DCGE 
model provide a reasonable approximation of the consequences of HIV/AIDS on growth, poverty and 
inequality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
manufacturing, but we assume similar prevalence rates for mining. Similarly, we assign the prevalence rates of the tourism sector 
to the retail trade sector, and the prevalence rates of the transport sector to the remaining service sectors.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Two simulations are conducted to estimate the impact of HIV/AIDS during the period 2002-2025. The 
“AIDS” scenario captures the current growth paths of KZN and RSA, drawing on the demographic 
projections for population and labor supply, and observed trends for TFP and labor productivity growth.
16 
Then, under the hypothetical “No AIDS” scenario, we adjust the demographic projections to capture the 
higher population, labor supply and productivity growth rates that would be seen in the absence of 
HIV/AIDS. In this section, we compare the results from these two simulations. 
Growth and Employment 
Tables 5 and 6 present the growth and employment results from the DCGE model. Given the 
demographic projections, HIV/AIDS reduces KZN’s overall population growth rate from an average of 
1.85 percent during 2002-2025 under the “No AIDS” scenario to 0.79 percent in the “AIDS” scenario. 
This is larger than the decline in the population growth rate for RSA due to the province’s higher HIV 
prevalence. Similarly, the declines in the African population are substantially larger than those for other 
races due to the higher prevalence of HIV among Africans.  
Table 5. Growth and poverty results, 2002-2025 
  KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)  Rest of South Africa (RSA) 
  Initial,  
2002 
Annual growth (%)  Initial,  
2002 
Annual growth (%) 
  AIDS   No AIDS  AIDS   No AIDS 
GDP (R billions)  171  2.84  4.44  872  3.04  4.46 
GDP per capita (R)  18,464  2.03  2.54  24,723  2.23  2.88 
Population (millions)  9,250  0.79  1.85  35,252  0.79  1.54 
   African  7,999  0.93  2.08  28,045  0.94  1.80 
   Other  1,252  -0.23  -0.03  7,207  0.17  0.37 
Dependency ratio (pop / employ.)  4.86  5.05  4.98  4.41  4.40  4.31 
      African  households  5.57 5.62 5.38 4.94  4.82  4.60 
      Other  households  2.69 2.73 2.82 3.12  3.13  3.21 
Total factor productivity  -  0.03  0.60  -  -0.04  0.50 
Household  savings  rate  (%)  1.76 1.40 3.51 0.50  0.40  1.00 
Health spending share of income (%)  13.55 20.87 14.33 14.02 21.44 14.90 
Poverty  rates  (%)         
   Incidence of poverty (P0)  36.66  19.46  20.00  24.83  10.50  9.51 
   Depth of poverty (P1)  14.73  6.02  6.20  9.40  3.46  3.15 
   Severity of poverty (P2)  7.71  2.69  2.77  4.91  1.74  1.60 
Number  of  poor  people  (thousands)  3,391 2,157 2,819 8,752 4,438  4,759 
Number of AIDS deaths (thousands)  -  3,011  0  -  7,793  0 
Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
Notes: Poverty is based on US$2- a-day poverty line (R161 per adult equivalent per month in 2000 prices).  
                                                      
16 Demographic projections provide time-series estimates for DH (eq. [9]), DL (eq. [10]), DP and DM (eq. [11). Observed 
trends for 1990-2007 provide estimates of μ (eq. [11]), φ (eq. [12]), π and κ (eq. [13]). Together, these parameters define the 
exogenous dynamic component of the DCGE model. Static component parameters and behavioral elasticities are either 
econometrically estimated or drawn from the 2002 SAM.   
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Table 6. Labor market results, 2002-2025 
  KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)  Rest of South Africa (RSA) 
  Initial, 
2002 
Annual growth (%)  Initial, 
2002 
Annual growth (%) 
  AIDS   No AIDS   AIDS   No AIDS 
Employment  (1000s)  1,902 0.63  1.75  7,988 0.81  1.64 
     African  1,436  0.90  2.24  5,677  1.05  2.11 
          Skilled  184  0.87  1.73  679  1.01  1.67 
          Semi-skilled  718  0.99  2.23  2,844  1.06  2.04 
          Low-skilled  534  0.78  2.43  2,154  1.05  2.33 
     Other  466  -0.31  -0.24  2,311  0.15  0.24 
Labor  productivity  - 1.80  1.92  - 1.80  1.88 
     African  -  1.80  2.02  -  1.80  1.95 
          Skilled  -  1.80  1.93  -  1.80  1.89 
          Semi-skilled  -  1.80  2.02  -  1.80  1.96 
          Low-skilled  -  1.80  2.10  -  1.80  2.00 
     Other  -  1.80  1.82  -  1.80  1.82 
Wages  (Rand)  75,511 3.09  4.05  96,054 2.94  3.93 
     African  59,219  2.48  2.88  91,944  2.67  3.33 
          Skilled  64,824  2.53  3.24  120,083  2.76  3.63 
          Semi-skilled  33,516  2.30  2.69  41,826  2.33  2.89 
          Low-skilled  20,098  2.63  1.86  21,979  2.74  2.33 
     Other  91,803  3.44  4.68  100,163  3.19  4.41 
Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
The declines in labor supply caused by HIV/AIDS are larger than the declines in population 
growth (see Table 6). For example, the population growth rate falls by 1.06 percent in KZN while 
employment growth falls by 1.12 percent. This reflects the concentration of HIV infections among 
working age adults. Since employment growth exceeds population growth, the dependency ratio falls 
slightly under the “No AIDS” scenario, from 5.05 to 4.98. This is driven by African households, which 
are characterized by lower-skilled workers with higher HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, and are therefore 
more affected by the disease. Thus, part of the higher dependency ratio seen for African households is 
driven by HIV/AIDS, which reduces the African working-age population faster than it reduces the 
African population as a whole. The reverse is true for other racial groups, albeit only slightly.   
High HIV prevalence and larger proportions of AIDS-sick people explain why HIV/AIDS has a 
more negative effect on labor productivity in KZN than in the rest of the country (see Table 6). Based on 
observed trends, labor productivity grows at 1.8 percent under the “AIDS” scenario. However, this is 
below the 1.92 percent that would have been achieved in KZN without AIDS-related morbidity and 
worker absences. Productivity losses from HIV/AIDS are largest for lower-skilled African workers due to 
their higher HIV prevalence. These variations in labor supply and productivity impacts underline the 
importance of differentiating among skill levels and occupation groups when estimating the 
macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS.  
Based on the results of other studies, we assume that HIV/AIDS reduces annual TFP growth by 
0.5 percent per year (see the discussion in Section 3). The overall losses in TFP growth in the DCGE 
model are slightly larger due to endogenous shifts in resources towards more productive industries (see 
Table 5). This makes the economywide TFP growth rate about 0.6 percentage points higher under the “No 
AIDS” scenario. It should also be noted that the reported changes in the TFP growth rate are independent  
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of the implied TFP changes caused by labor productivity improvements. Together, higher productivity 
and labor supply induce an expansion of gross domestic product (GDP); the average annual GDP growth 
rate in KZN increases from 2.84 percent under the “AIDS” scenario to 4.44 percent under the “No AIDS” 
scenario (i.e., HIV/AIDS lowers KZN’s annual GDP growth rate by 1.60 percent per year). This is greater 
than the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on the rest of South Africa’s GDP growth rate, which is reduced 
by 1.42 percent per year. Compounding these reductions in annual growth rates means that the KZN and 
RSA economies are projected to be 43 and 37 percent smaller, respectively, in 2025 than they would have 
been in the absence of HIV/AIDS.  
Industrial Growth  
Impacts differ by industry and region (see Table 7). Although the overall decline in economic growth due 
to HIV/AIDS is larger in KZN than in RSA, this is not the case for all individual sectors. The DCGE 
model captures the varying skill intensities of employment by sector and region from the 2004 labor force 
survey (StatsSA, 2005). This information indicates that the construction industry in KZN is more skill-
intensive than that in RSA, with 18 percent of employment comprising low-skilled workers in KZN 
compared to 26 percent in RSA. Thus, by reducing the supply of lower-skilled workers, HIV/AIDS 
hampers the construction industry more in RSA than in KZN. Similarly, unskilled workers account for 22 
percent of employment in RSA’s water utilities industry, compared to only 10 percent in KZN. Therefore, 
additional GDP growth in these industries is higher in RSA than in KZN under the “No AIDS” scenario.  
Table 7. Change in industrial growth results, 2002-2025 
  Point change in growth rate in “No AIDS” scenario 
1  Ratio of KZN to 
RSA growth rate 
changes (1) / (2) 
  KZN RSA 
  (1) (2) 
All sectors (total GDP)  1.60  1.42  1.13 
     Agriculture  1.88  1.42  1.32 
     Mining  1.93  1.66  1.16 
     Food processing  1.74  1.40  1.24 
     Textiles & clothing  1.66  1.56  1.06 
     Wood products  1.46  1.46  1.00 
     Chemicals  1.22  1.47  0.83 
     Non-metal minerals  1.72  1.70  1.02 
     Machinery  1.53  1.61  0.95 
     Electrical machinery  2.28  1.67  1.37 
     Scientific equipment  1.64  1.41  1.16 
     Transport equipment  1.59  1.44  1.10 
     Other manufactures  1.55  1.53  1.01 
     Electricity  2.05  1.38  1.49 
     Water and gas  1.47  1.61  0.91 
     Construction  1.91  1.93  0.99 
     Trade services  1.82  1.47  1.23 
     Hotels & catering  1.64  1.45  1.13 
     Transport services  1.63  1.52  1.08 
     Communications  1.76  1.51  1.17 
     Financial services  1.89  1.53  1.24 
     Business services  1.95  1.49  1.31 
Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
1. Percentage point change in annual growth rate between “AIDS” and “No AIDS”; Scenarios (i.e., not a percentage change).   
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Although HIV/AIDS has detrimental effects on industries in RSA, the majority of industries that 
are most severely hurt by the pandemic are in KZN. This is particularly true for agriculture in KZN, 
where the AIDS seroprevalence survey data and demographic modeling predict especially high HIV 
prevalence rates. Moreover, this impact on agriculture has negative downstream implications for food 
processing in KZN. Although the model does not capture rural-urban differences, the large increase in 
agriculture’s growth rate under the “No AIDS” scenario suggests that the impacts of HIV/AIDS are likely 
to be more severe in rural areas. Had the model explicitly captured the higher HIV prevalence in rural 
areas, such outcomes would have been more pronounced.  
Among the industries in KZN that are adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, the electrical machinery 
and electricity industries are most severely undermined. The 2002 supply-use table (StatsSA, 2004) (on 
which the DCGE is based) indicates that the electrical machinery sector is less capital-intensive than most 
other industries in the economy. Thus, this sector is more vulnerable to the reductions in labor supply 
caused by HIV/AIDS. Moreover, electrical machinery has a high income elasticity (1.23), which suggests 
that demand is particularly sensitive to changes in incomes. In contrast, other light manufacturing 
industries (e.g., food products and textiles) have lower income elasticities. As a result, the fall in national 
income caused by HIV/AIDS generates larger declines in demand for electrical machinery than for food 
products or textiles. Finally, most jobs in KZN’s electrical machinery industry are for lower-skilled 
workers, who are most affected by HIV/AIDS. Collectively, these characteristics of the electrical 
machinery industry explain the considerable acceleration of its growth under the “No AIDS” scenario.  
The water utilities industry is also less skill-intensive in KZN than in RSA. However, unlike the 
electrical machinery industry, the water utilities industry is far more capital-intensive than most of the 
other industries in the economy. Thus, it is less the decline in labor supply that undermines growth in this 
industry, but rather the negative consequences of HIV/AIDS for investment and capital accumulation. 
Our model results indicate that the share of investment in GDP is 2.1 percent lower under the “AIDS” 
scenario. While most of this decline in investment is due to the slowdown in economic growth caused by 
HIV/AIDS, about 28 percent of the decline results from lower household savings (see Table 5). Thus, the 
deceleration in economic growth, especially in certain sectors, is driven by the indirect macroeconomic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS rather than by its direct impact on population and labor supply.  
Poverty and Inequality 
The impact of HIV/AIDS on income poverty is small (see Table 5). Poverty is measured using the US$2 
per day poverty line (which was equal to R161 per person per month in 2000 – the survey year for the 
micro-simulation module). The model results indicate that, without HIV/AIDS, the incidence of poverty 
(or poverty headcount) would be only slightly lower in RSA, at 9.51 under the “No AIDS” scenario 
compared to 10.50 under the “AIDS” scenario. Moreover, the poverty headcount in KZN would be 
virtually unchanged (or slightly higher).
17 These impacts are small because the net effect of HIV/AIDS on 
income poverty depends on two opposing factors. On the one hand, the drop in the working-age adult 
population and the rise in dependency ratios reduce households’ incomes. On the other hand, poverty is 
based on per capita expenditures, which may increase if the decline in household populations exceeds the 
loss of income. The overall poverty impact therefore depends on which of the two factors dominate. 
It is surprising that the model predicts both slightly higher poverty and falling dependency ratios in KZN 
under the “No AIDS” scenario. We find that poverty remains virtually unchanged because the decrease in 
wages, which is caused by labor demand constraints, implies that household incomes increase more 
slowly than population growth (see Table 6). Falling wages are more pronounced for lower-skilled 
African workers, whose wage growth rate falls from 2.63 percent under the “AIDS” scenario to 1.86 
percent under the “No AIDS” scenario. In contrast, higher-skilled workers have lower HIV prevalence 
rates and  benefit more from faster economic growth (i.e., their wages rise). Thus, the structural 
                                                      
17 The poverty outcomes are extremely sensitive to changes in the definition of the poverty line. This is especially true for 
KZN, since its growth incidence curve crosses the x-axis almost at the final-year poverty rate (see Figure 1). Greater attention 
should therefore be paid to the distributional impacts of HIV/AIDS.  
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constraints that contribute to high unemployment in South Africa remain even in the absence of 
HIV/AIDS. More specifically, our results indicate that the KZN and RSA economies would continue to 
become more capital- and skill-intensive over time even if the supply and productivity of lower-skilled 
workers were not undermined by HIV/AIDS.  
It is also an apparent contradiction that poverty remains virtually unchanged in KZN under the 
“No AIDS” scenario even though per capita GDP growth accelerates by 0.5 percent (see Table 5). This 
finding underlines the importance of considering industry- and household-level details that are not 
captured by aggregate growth models. Aggregate GDP and consumption measures hide the distributional 
changes caused by HIV/AIDS. Figure 1 presents the “growth incidence curves” for KZN and RSA. These 
curves show the change in the growth rate of annual per capita expenditure for each individual in the 
population, ranked by initial expenditure level.  

























































Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
The mean of both regions’ curves is positive, reflecting the increases in aggregate per capita 
income under the “No AIDS” scenario. However, the growth incidence curves are upward-sloping, 
indicating that lower-income households would benefit less than higher-income households from the 
absence of HIV/AIDS. This suggests that income inequality would be higher during 2002-2025 if 
HIV/AIDS did not exist. A number of factors can explain this result. First, as mentioned earlier, the 
increased supply of lower-skilled workers is offset by falling wages, leaving per capita incomes amongst 
households largely unchanged at the lower end of the distribution. The reverse is true for higher-skilled 
workers, whose wages rise with faster economic growth. Secondly, unemployment is high among 
working-age adults living in poorer households. Therefore, reducing adult mortality may increase these 
households’ dependency ratios, causing per capita incomes to fall. This is the case for lower-income 
households in KZN, where unemployment is particularly high and the growth incidence curve is negative. 
While removing the effects of HIV/AIDS improves overall household welfare, it is detrimental for lower-
income household poverty in KZN, where unemployment is especially severe.   
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A third reason for the increase in inequality may be better understood by measuring the 
contribution of the five impact channels to the overall changes in GDP growth rates and poverty rates 
under the “No AIDS” scenario (see Table 8). The table shows that the effect of HIV/AIDS on labor 
supply and TFP dominates the economic growth outcomes from the economywide model (i.e., they 
account for 85 percent of the increase in the GDP growth rate). We have already discussed how increases 
in labor supply cause declines in lower-skilled workers’ wages, thus reducing the income gains due to 
reduced mortality under the “No AIDS” scenario. Moreover, increased labor productivity and reduced 
health spending have only small effects on economic growth. Thus, the direct channels linking HIV/AIDS 
to poorer households are less important than the indirect TFP effects.  
Table 8. Contributions of impact channels, 2002-2025 
  Growth rate (%)  Poverty rate (%-point) 
  KZN RSA KZN  RSA 
Total change  1.60  1.42  0.54  -0.99 
Labor supply  0.63  0.50  -2.51  -1.36 
Labor productivity  0.11  0.08  -0.31  -0.32 
Total factor productivity  0.73  0.73  -4.13  -2.64 
Private savings/investment   0.13  0.11  -0.84  -0.56 
Population  growth  0.00 0.00 8.33 3.88 
Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
1. Percentage point change in final year poverty rate (i.e., not a percentage change).  
The dominance of indirect impact channels is also evident in the poverty decomposition, which 
shows how the direct channels’ contributions to poverty reduction are smaller than that of TFP growth. 
They are also far smaller than the downward pressure placed on per capita incomes by higher population 
growth. Thus, TFP drives the overall growth increase and poverty reduction seen in RSA under the “No 
AIDS” scenario. However, TFP growth does not just benefit households with HIV-infected working 
adults. Rather, faster economic growth driven by TFP improvements drives up demand for all workers, 
including those from groups in which HIV prevalence is initially low. Thus, the third explanation for how 
the removal of HIV/AIDS causes inequality to rise is that TFP benefits all households and workers 
regardless of their HIV infection status. Higher-income households therefore benefit from faster 
economic growth despite low infection rates. This finding highlights the importance of taking 




5. CONCLUSIONS  
KwaZulu-Natal, together with the rest of South Africa, suffers from severe unemployment and poverty. 
Moreover, the province has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world. This paper estimates the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on economic growth and income poverty in KZN and RSA. Drawing on the 
findings from a firm-level survey in four of KZN’s major economic sectors, we integrate the projections 
from a demographic model within a regionalized DCGE model. This in turn is linked to a survey-based 
micro-simulation module in order to estimate poverty and distributional outcomes. This approach extends 
previous studies by focusing on South Africa’s most afflicted region; basing its projections on more 
reliable estimates of HIV prevalence for workers across occupational groups; and explicitly integrating 
demographic, economywide, and survey-based models. 
The results indicate that HIV/AIDS undermines economic growth in South Africa. It lowers the 
GDP growth rate by 1.60 and 1.42 percentage points per year in KZN and RSA, respectively. 
Cumulatively, these losses means that the KZN economy will be 43 percent smaller in 2025 than it would 
have been in the absence of HIV/AIDS. The rest of the country’s economy will be 37 percent smaller. 
While the detrimental growth-effect is large, the impact of HIV/AIDS on regional poverty headcounts is 
relatively small, and this inequality would be higher in the absence of HIV/AIDS. The small change in 
per capita incomes amongst the poor population should be interpreted alongside the estimated 11.8 
million projected population decline caused by HIV/AIDS during 2002-2025. Thus, the gains in 
economic growth in the absence of HIV/AIDS are sufficient to offset the pressure placed on poverty by 
the survival of a substantially larger population. Moreover, the incentive to mitigate the effects of 
HIV/AIDS lies not only with poorer households and those with infected members, but also with 
uninfected and higher-income households that stand to benefit from faster economic growth and rising 
incomes. These findings reveal that HIV/AIDS places a significant burden on future economic 
development in KwaZulu-Natal and the rest of the South Africa, and underlines the need for policies and 
investments to curb the pandemic. 
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APPENDIX: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON DCGE MODEL RESULTS 
Three models are used sequentially in our analysis: ASSA-2003, APM and DCGE. Given the possibility 
of measurement and model errors at each stage, it is important to consider the sensitivity of our results. 
For example, the firm-level survey estimated an overall sample HIV prevalence rate with a margin of 
error of 1.1 percentage points (based on a 95 percent confidence interval). It was necessary to smooth the 
results across workers and firms in order to arrive at prevalence rates suitable for calibrating the APM. 
The smoothing methods and confidence intervals around these estimated parameters are described in 
Matthews et al. (2008). The authors indicate that the confidence intervals are typically narrow, but that 
some cases have wide margins of error (e.g., the prevalence rate for female African workers in the 
transport sector). However, these intervals are wide because of the small share of these workers within the 
sectors’ overall workforces. Therefore, the impact on our economywide modeling results is likely to be 
small.  
The dominance of TFP in determining growth and poverty outcomes highlights the need for 
sensitivity analysis on the DCGE model’s results (see Table 7). Accordingly we place a 20 percent 
confidence interval around the changes in the growth rates for population, labor supply, labor 
productivity, TFP and health spending (i.e., the five impact channels). Figure A.1 shows how the 
contribution of each channel varies under these high and low assumptions. For example, in KZN, 
alteration of the labor supply growth rate has a significant impact on the final GDP growth rate under the 
“No AIDS” scenario. This is evidenced by the gap between low and high GDP growth rates when the 
effects of the labor supply channel are isolated. Similarly wide gaps exist for TFP. Combining each 
channel’s upper and lower bounds produces the overall range of growth outcomes under the “No AIDS” 
scenario. Overall, the sensitivity analysis suggests that HIV/AIDS reduces KZN’s GDP growth rate by 
between 1.28 and 1.93 percent per year. Similarly, the loss of GDP in RSA ranges from 1.14 to 1.71 
percent per year. Although these ranges are wide, they assume a persistent accumulation of errors in the 
same direction for all five channels (i.e., it is assumed that we have either under- or overestimated all 
channels concurrently).  
Figure A.2 shows the sensitivity analysis for poverty outcomes. It is important to note that 
population changes work in the opposite direction to other channels. The most important channel for 
determining final-year poverty is the change in the population growth rate, where the upper and lower 
bounds far exceed those of the other impact channels. While overestimating population growth raises 
final-year poverty, overestimation of all other channels’ growth effects tends to reduce poverty. This 
explains why the cumulative confidence interval for all other channels combined is relatively narrow. 
Thus, even if the predicted increase in labor supply under the “No AIDS” scenario is underestimated, this 
would imply a similar underestimation of population growth, which would dominate and again cause 
poverty to increase in KZN. The finding that poverty would increase in KZN in the absence of HIV/AIDS 
is therefore fairly robust to the assumptions on the relative weights of the impact channels. It is, however, 
sensitive to changes in the definition of the poverty line.  
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Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
Note: Outcomes are cumulative (for example, labor productivity includes the outcomes from labor supply). Horizontal bars show 
upper and lower bounds after assuming a 20 percent confidence interval around the additional growth rate resulting from each 
impact channel.  
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Source: Provincial DCGE model results. 
Note: Outcomes are cumulative (for example, labor productivity includes the outcomes from labor supply). Horizontal bars show 
upper and lower bounds after assuming a 20 percent confidence interval around the additional growth rate resulting from each 
impact channel.  
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